Book traces shift in Russian intelligence from long-term agents to disposable sources

Sean Wiswesser, a longtime U.S. Central Intelligence Agency officer who worked mainly on Russia and the former Soviet Union, has published a book examining the structure and activities of Russia's intelligence and security services. Reviewing it, diplomat Harri Tiido notes that accounts from former intelligence officers can be more revealing than official memoirs, since such authors have less reason to conceal information.

Influence operations and structure

The book argues that Russian security services have successfully shaped public opinion through operations tied to the 2008 war in Georgia, the 2014 events in Crimea and Donbas, and interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election aimed at undermining trust in the electoral system.

Russia's security services trace back to the era of Ivan the Terrible and have long held major societal influence. Today the Federal Security Service (FSB), successor to parts of the KGB, effectively controls much of Russian society and has taken over some foreign intelligence functions in the so-called near abroad. Military intelligence, the GRU, handles cyber operations and satellite intelligence. The FSB's largest and most powerful branch is reportedly its counterintelligence Third Directorate, and it controls all communications within Russia.

Corruption and war planning

Wiswesser points to persistent corruption and nepotism within the FSB and other services, affecting career advancement and honest reporting to superiors. FSB operational units have also been closely tied to planning the war against Ukraine, which could eventually raise accountability questions for some senior officials.

Changing recruitment tactics

Historically, integrating illegal agents into Western societies proved difficult, and many were exposed after the Soviet collapse. In the 1990s, Russia began using dual citizens living abroad, though these operatives often lacked professional training. Modern verification tools, including social media, have made deploying illegal agents nearly pointless, pushing services toward one-time sources and so-called useful idiots motivated by ego.

Recruitment methods persist nonetheless — tourists visiting Russia, diplomats targeted through honey traps, including trained female operatives known as "swallows" reportedly linked to an institution in Kazan. Wiswesser concludes that Russian intelligence activity in the West has grown more dangerous, increasingly targeting infrastructure and spreading disinformation, sometimes with unwitting help from local politicians.