European war game: how Ukraine's experience could be used in a Russian attack scenario on Lithuania
A war game held in Tel Aviv in September simulated Russian escalation against Lithuania, with Ukrainian participants. It exposed gaps in European coordination and raised the question of how to use Ukraine's combat experience.
In mid-September, a war game, a military simulation, took place in Tel Aviv in which experts tested how Germany and its allies would respond if Russia escalated tensions near the Lithuanian border, on NATO's northeastern flank. It was organised by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation and Israel's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Participants came from Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, Israel and the United States. The author of the article, a columnist for the Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda, played the role of Ukraine's president and described her experience.
Background
The game was designed as a response to a simulation held a year earlier called Ernstfall, run by the German outlet WELT with the Bundeswehr University's war gaming centre in Hamburg. In that scenario, Russia occupied Lithuanian territory, including the city of Marijampolė, a German brigade stayed in its barracks, and the German players tended to de-escalate rather than win. The US did not help.
The scenario
The scenario began in March 2027. Russia announced a humanitarian crisis in Kaliningrad and sent a humanitarian convoy there. Vilnius agreed to let it through only after an international inspection and without an armed escort. Moscow issued a six-hour ultimatum. Germany acted more firmly this time: it put its 45th brigade on combat readiness, authorised supplying Ukraine with Taurus missiles and moved against Russia's shadow oil fleet. Russia escalated, and a shootout occurred at the border. NATO activated regional defence plans but not Article 5. The US chose to negotiate with the Kremlin over Europeans' heads.
NATO asked Ukraine for drones, but participants realised that the real problem was a lack of people to operate them. The game ended inconclusively: a compromise proposal collapsed after an attack by drones of unknown origin in Poland.
Conclusions
Participants pointed to slow European decision-making, gaps in NATO–EU cooperation and the influence of the US. The author argues that Europe treats Ukraine as a risk to be managed rather than as a capability to rely on in joint planning.
