Russia's defense industry remains dependent on strategic mineral imports
A report by Ukraine's Economic Security Council reveals that Russia, despite its vast mineral reserves, remains reliant on imports of strategic minerals for military production, with most extraction projects not expected to reach industrial scale before 2035.

Russia's defense industry remains dependent on imports of several strategic minerals despite the country's vast natural resource reserves, according to a report by Ukraine's Economic Security Council (ESCU).
After 2022, the Kremlin announced plans to increase extraction of scarce raw materials, but ESCU assessments indicate that most projects will not deliver industrial-scale results before 2035, creating a window for external economic pressure.
China remains the largest supplier of strategic minerals to Russia. Between April 2024 and March 2025, Beijing supplied 1.6 million tonnes of alumina worth $1 billion, 240 tonnes of tungsten worth $9.8 million, 3.8 tonnes of tantalum worth $4 million, and 1,732 tonnes of niobium products worth $64 million.
Ferroniobium was also supplied to Russia from Brazil – 1,033 tonnes worth over $33 million, and from Canada – 388 tonnes worth $12.8 million. This material is used in high-strength and heat-resistant steels for missile casings, engines, and armored vehicles. Another 82 tonnes of Dutch ferroniobium reached Russia via Turkey, while 40 tonnes of Brazilian and Canadian material transited through Germany.
Ireland supplied 960,350 tonnes of alumina worth $567.68 million, used in aluminum production for military aircraft and cruise missiles. Kazakhstan accounted for 69% of tantalum imports and 76% of beryllium products. Uzbekistan supplied 3.95 tonnes of rhenium raw materials, and Belarus an additional 290 tonnes. Armenia exported 2,058 tonnes of molybdenum products, primarily ferromolybdenum.
ESCU analysts traced deliveries to manufacturers of weapon systems including Iskander-M, Kinzhal, Pantsir-S, and Kh-59. "Halting supplies of strategic minerals will inevitably lead to weapons shortages in Russia and become a powerful argument in favor of a ceasefire. However, this requires decisive economic restrictions against the entire supply ecosystem," said Olena Yurchenko, ESCU Director for Analytics, Research and Investigations.

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