Slaidiņš: Possible Russian mobilization of 300,000 could serve three different goals
Latvian National Guard staff officer Jānis Slaidiņš analyzes Ukrainian intelligence reports on a potential Russian mobilization wave of up to 300,000 people, outlining where such forces might be deployed. The most likely scenario involves reinforcing already occupied areas in Donetsk region.
Ukraine's defense intelligence agencies reported in August that Russia is preparing additional mobilization waves for 2026 and 2027, each potentially calling up to 300,000 people. This information cannot be independently verified. Latvian National Armed Forces Major and National Guard staff officer Jānis Slaidiņš discussed on TV24 the scenarios outlined by Ukrainian military analyst Oleksandr Kovalenko regarding how such reinforcements might be used.
Holding existing positions
Slaidiņš considers the most likely option to be using mobilized troops to hold already occupied territory and reinforce Russia's main offensive directions, particularly in the Donetsk region — the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration area, as well as around Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka and Dobropillia. This would free experienced units for more active combat operations while new conscripts maintain defensive positions and replace losses in depleted units. Slaidiņš notes that prior military training does not automatically make someone ready for modern combat, making training quality crucial.
A new pressure point
A more complex scenario would involve opening a new active front line, such as in the Chernihiv region, though Kovalenko himself has expressed skepticism about the military rationale for such an attack. Even limited activity there would force Ukraine to divert additional units and reserves from other sectors. Forces could also be used in the already active border areas of Sumy and Kharkiv regions, and could be freed up from defending the Kursk region border area if the situation there stabilizes.
Confrontation with NATO
The least likely scenario would be preparation for direct military confrontation with a NATO country. Slaidiņš points out that Russia maintains military infrastructure in the Leningrad Military District and Pskov region, but no strike grouping currently exists that would indicate preparation for such an attack. In the Baltic region, hybrid-type provocations remain the more pressing concern.
Slaidiņš emphasizes that mobilization alone would not mean an immediate breakthrough — new soldiers first need training, equipment, unit assignment and command structures. The key question is how quickly these people could reach combat units and on which front sector Moscow would attempt to shift the balance of forces.
