European war games: how Russian aggression against the Baltics is simulated and what role Ukraine would play
A military simulation held in Tel Aviv in September modelled Russian aggression against Lithuania, with participants from several countries including Ukraine. It exposed gaps in European coordination and raised the question of whether Ukraine is treated as a risk or as a capability.
In mid-September, a war game, a military strategy simulation, was held in Tel Aviv to test how Europe would respond to Russian aggression against the Baltic states. It was organised by Germany's Friedrich Naumann Foundation and Israel's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Participants came from Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, Israel and the United States. The author of the source piece, representing Ukraine, played the Ukrainian president. The exercise matters because it shows where Europe's preparedness still has gaps.
The earlier game
The simulation had a predecessor. Last year, the German outlet WELT and the Wargaming Center of the Bundeswehr University in Hamburg ran a game called Ernstfall ("emergency"). Sixteen participants played the West and Russia, and in the scenario Russia attacked Lithuania in October 2026. The outcome drew wide attention: Lithuanian territory was occupied, the city of Marijampolė came under Russian control, and the NATO German brigade stayed in its barracks. The United States did not help.
This year's scenario
The new game was set in March 2027. Russia declared a humanitarian crisis in Kaliningrad and sent a humanitarian convoy there, while up to 10,000 Russian troops were on standby in western Belarus. Vilnius offered to let the convoy through after an international inspection and without an armed Russian escort. Moscow refused and issued a six-hour ultimatum.
Germany acted more decisively this time: the 45th Brigade was moved to the Lithuanian border, the transfer of Taurus missiles to Ukraine was approved, and the EU moved against Russia's shadow oil fleet. Russia escalated; armed men in civilian clothes approached the border, and a shootout followed. NATO activated regional defence plans but did not invoke Article 5. US envoys struck a deal with the Kremlin over Europeans' heads. Kyiv was asked for drones, but it emerged that operators were lacking, so joint Ukraine-NATO exercises were used. After three weeks the crisis was unresolved, and the game ended inconclusively.
Takeaways
Participants pointed to slow European decision-making, gaps in NATO-EU cooperation, and the US acting as a third party. The author argues that as long as Europe sees Ukraine as a risk rather than a capability, joint planning will not be possible.
