How makeup influencers become tools of Russian propaganda

A Facebook group dedicated to selling second-hand clothes or home fragrances suddenly starts posting about government scandals and geopolitical conspiracies. Most users scroll past, but according to Alfredas Chmieliauskas, co-founder of Lithuanian analytics company Repsense, that is exactly the point.

Repsense’s monitoring of social media activity in Lithuania reveals a coordinated and sophisticated operation. In one tracked case, six groups produced around 60,000 messages and 20,000 comments over three months, reaching an audience of approximately 30 million views. The network involved only about 300 people. Most messages were copied or minimally altered, sometimes with the help of AI.

Chmieliauskas says the content is largely distributed by real people, not bots. When messages appear at nearly the same time across groups, automation is suspected; but when gaps of hours occur with imperfect copying, it indicates human distribution.

Common narratives include attacks on governments and democratic institutions, promoting “traditional family values” against Western ones, and narratives about the war in Ukraine designed to reduce support for Kyiv. In Lithuania, a specific narrative targets the planned NATO training ground at Kapčiamiestis, portraying it not as a defensive installation but as a provocation against Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave.

Propagandists use several archetypes: distortion (e.g., claiming Poland opposes the facility), seemingly rational arguments (“we already have nine training grounds”), conspiracy theories (preparing for war with Kaliningrad), anti-NATO framing, and fear-mongering. Hate speech also plays a role, with Jewish people being the most targeted group, especially amid the Middle East crisis.

A striking finding is how these narratives reach audiences that would never engage with overtly political content. Repsense identified influencers with large, apolitical followings—makeup tutorial creators, lifestyle accounts—who suddenly began posting political content aligned with pro-Russian narratives. On Facebook, commercial pages named “Home Fragrances” or “Second-hand Clothes” appeared to sell everyday goods but were interspersed with scandal stories and attacks on public figures.

Chmieliauskas advises against blanket bans, arguing that the most effective approach is to respond with better narratives. For law enforcement, he suggests mapping financial connections to follow the money. He also urges governments to conduct narrative risk assessments for strategically sensitive projects from the outset, explaining their importance to local residents.