How armed group alliances are reshaping Mali’s conflict and the wider Sahel

Ambush near Anefis signals new coordination

On July 18, an ambush near the northern Malian town of Anefis killed at least 50 Malian soldiers and struck a joint convoy of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and Russia’s Africa Corps (which replaced the Wagner Group). The attack was more than a battlefield setback: it underscored how armed groups in Mali are becoming increasingly coordinated, exposing the limits of the military government’s security strategy despite growing Russian military support.

The Malian military confirmed the assault and launched counter-operations. Africa Corps later released footage of drone strikes targeting fighters involved in the ambush. The attack is the latest in a series of coordinated operations across northern Mali since April, raising questions about why armed groups are cooperating, whether Bamako’s strategy is working, what Russia’s role has achieved, and what this means for the wider Sahel.

Why separatist and Islamist groups fight together

The July 18 ambush was jointly claimed by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a coalition of mainly Tuareg separatist groups, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate in the Sahel. Until recently, such cooperation seemed unlikely because of their differing long-term goals: the FLA seeks autonomy or independence for northern Mali, while JNIM aims to establish Islamic rule.

According to Héni Nsaibia of ACLED, the reason is a shared battlefield enemy rather than ideology. “The Tuareg-led separatists and JNIM are currently fighting together because they share a common enemy in the Malian armed forces and their Russian partners,” he told Al Jazeera. They act as force multipliers, pooling resources and mutualising efforts. Kinship ties and a shared sense of defending ancestral territory also bind them.

For the Malian military, this cooperation makes attacks harder to anticipate and repel. The government’s decision to abandon the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement, request the withdrawal of MINUSMA, and deepen military ties with Russia reshaped the conflict. The collapse of the peace framework removed a mechanism managing relations between Bamako and northern groups, while the confrontational approach encouraged former rivals to coordinate.

Has Russia changed the war?

Africa Corps has become an important partner for the Malian army, providing combat support, drones, and aircraft. However, as analyst Nimi Princewill noted, Russian support has not changed the overall picture. The army recaptured Kidal in November 2023, but Tuareg rebels retook it in April 2024 (presumably meant April 2025 or 2026? The source says April this year – referring to 2026). Despite Russian backing, convoys in the north still face frequent ambushes, exposing vulnerable supply lines. The withdrawal of MINUSMA ended logistics, monitoring, and intelligence support.

Has Bamako’s strategy paid off?

Since seizing power in 2020, the military junta has centred its strategy on military force, ending Western partnerships and strengthening ties with Russia. But repeated ambushes around Anefis suggest that tactical gains have not translated into lasting control. Moreover, the growing cooperation among armed groups shows they can adapt.

Implications for the wider Sahel

JNIM already operates across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The evolving battlefield challenges the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), whose members face persistent violence despite expanding military cooperation. If the FLA-JNIM partnership proves durable, it could encourage similar tactical cooperation elsewhere in the Sahel, complicating efforts to contain groups that cross borders. As a Niger-based security expert said: “When Mali bleeds, Niger bleeds with it.”