NYT reveals how Russia gets Japanese technology into its weapons: a secret GRU unit, an Aeroflot cover job, and a cargo route through Sri Lanka
Russian weapons repeatedly contain Japanese-made components. The New York Times investigation reveals that a classified GRU unit, the 20th Directorate, is responsible for acquiring these technologies in Japan, run by Maksim Filchenkov undercover as an Aeroflot employee in Tokyo.
The New York Times, citing current and former officials from five Western intelligence agencies, reports that a secret unit of Russia’s military intelligence agency (GRU) — the 20th Directorate — is responsible for acquiring Japanese dual-use technology. The operation in Tokyo is led by Maksim Filchenkov, 49, who has been working undercover as an Aeroflot employee since February 2024.
Independent Russian outlet The Insider confirms Filchenkov is a career GRU officer. He was once registered at a dormitory for the Military Diplomatic Academy, at the same address used by Anatoly Chepiga — the man known as Ruslan Boshirov, accused by British authorities of poisoning former GRU colonel Sergei Skripal. Filchenkov’s car was regularly seen parked outside GRU headquarters. Another independent outlet, Agentstvo, points to his possible intelligence ties through leaked data analysis. Filchenkov has been listed as an Aeroflot employee since at least 2015 and has held a deputy head role since 2024.
Using Aeroflot jobs as cover for GRU officers dates back to the Soviet era, as noted in a declassified 1985 U.S. intelligence report. The airline’s Tokyo office is a 10-minute walk from Japan’s National Police Agency, which investigates espionage. While Aeroflot is not sanctioned in Japan, its operations are effectively suspended because it cannot obtain necessary parts and services. However, these restrictions do not apply to Aeroflot’s official partners.
One such partner, Proco Air, describes itself as a “bridge between Japan and Russia.” It books cargo space on flights to countries where Aeroflot still operates — such as Uzbekistan and Sri Lanka — and then Aeroflot carries the cargo to Russia. On paper, this arrangement is legal. Proco Air’s owner, Takehiko Miki, said he met Filchenkov around 2018 but only began working with him in earnest in 2024. Miki denied knowing about Filchenkov’s GRU ties and claimed he never helped transport prohibited goods. However, in 2025, Miki approached a business contact in China introduced by Filchenkov and asked for help shipping banned cargo to Russia.
Miki asserts Proco Air only delivers “medical equipment and cosmetics.” As proof, he showed an air waybill but tried to black out company names with a pen. The document still revealed the recipient as Russian pharmaceutical firm R-Pharm. Its founder, Alexei Repik, described as a friend of Vladimir Putin’s daughter, has reportedly helped Russian authorities evade sanctions. R-Pharm is not under sanctions.
Ukraine has repeatedly warned Japan about smuggling of Japanese technology into Russia. In April 2025 alone, it sent at least eight formal diplomatic letters to Japan’s Foreign Ministry, providing evidence that components from Japanese firms like NEC, Panasonic, and Toshiba ended up in Russian weapons. All companies denied wrongdoing. Western governments have also alerted Tokyo about GRU efforts. Japan’s response has been slow, partly because the country lacks a foreign intelligence agency — one is only now being established.
NYT reporters visited the Aeroflot Tokyo office three times in early 2026. The entrance resembled a prison cell door. They never found Filchenkov; instead, a middle-aged woman with a Russian Orthodox cross told them after a brief phone call that Filchenkov did not want to talk.
