Potential replacement of Fedorov as Defense Minister raises concerns over corruption risks and institutional memory
Plans to replace Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov with Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko have sparked protests and criticism from civil society and the EU, citing risks to anti-corruption reforms and long-term defense programs.

Following the government's resignation on July 14 and a closed session of the Servant of the People faction on July 15, it has become known that current Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko is being considered for the post of Defense Minister. He would become the fifth defense minister since the full-scale invasion began. This potential change has raised concerns both in Ukrainian society and among international partners.
The authors note that the Ministry of Defense will see its third leadership change in the last 12 months. Each rotation requires months of audit and appointment of new directors, which is an unacceptable luxury during wartime. Particular concern centers on whether the new team will roll back previous anti-corruption policies, such as competitive procurement and increased financial support. Protests against such a move have already taken place in Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and other cities, and the Public Anti-Corruption Council under the Ministry of Defense has criticized the president's decision.
Several critical initiatives are at risk: international partnerships (Drone Deal, joint production abroad, licensed production of Western systems), innovation and procurement (DOT-Chain Defence ecosystem, small air defense systems), strategic security (participation in the European anti-ballistic system project FREYJA), and long-term planning (multi-year contracts and 2027 funding).
EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius openly stated that Fedorov's possible dismissal came as a great surprise. He emphasized that the EU has closely cooperated with Fedorov's team, which achieved significant progress in long-range strikes and scaling defense production. The replacement will inevitably raise questions in the EU, as effective interaction on transparent use of European funding had already been established.
The authors cite two possible reasons for Fedorov's removal: a conflict in working approaches with Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi and the urgent need to significantly increase mobilization rates ahead of possible mirror processes in Russia in autumn 2026.
Ihor Klymenko, who has been in the internal affairs system since 1998, is described as a strong manager with a military-administrative background. Under his leadership, the “Guard of Offensive” initiative is considered a successful military recruitment case. Klymenko is already deeply involved in mobilization processes, having expanded the National Police's powers. He has also coordinated complex interagency efforts such as humanitarian demining (by April 2026, almost 200,000 hectares had been cleared). Additionally, he implemented digitalization and anti-corruption measures in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including a radical reform of service centers in 2024 that led to the dismissal of 25 regional heads.
However, the authors express concern that Klymenko's appointment may not improve mobilization because the problem is not a lack of people but trust. Fedorov was one of the few who tried to restore the social contract between the state and citizens; if the response is to appoint someone the public does not trust, mobilization will become even harder. The authors call for an end to chaotic changes of defense ministers without public justification.


